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Abstract 
The criminal justice system is constituted of criminal norms, institutions and 
methods, among others. Interpretation of the criminal law is a process that 
transforms the text of the law into reality. The process is influenced by various 
factors, such as, the courts’ conception of the criminal law, the concept and 
practice of interpretation and how the interpreting institutions understand their 
role. The understanding of the three elements evolved over the years. The 
exegetic school, taking statutes as the sole source of the criminal law, argue for 
using ‘strict’ methods of interpretation. However, the hermeneutic school holds 
that interpretation is about the understanding of the law as well as finding the 
law to the facts of a case, thus, they argue for doctrinal interpretation. The 
various doctrines of the criminal law constituting meta-norms scaffold the 
ordinary interpretative methods of the criminal norms. This article discusses the 
methods in law, which constitute an essential part of the criminal justice 
system. After a brief introduction of those elements of the ‘system’, it delves 
into the structures, the criminal norms as objects of interpretation and their 
relation to the meta-norms, guiding the interpretation process. It examines the 
notion of interpretation relative to legislative drafting and augmenting 
knowledge of the criminal law. Finally, as there are various factors that push 
the court into the realm of formalism, it also argues for a manner of 
interpretation, away from judicial formalism.  
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In the past few decades, a different theory of the nature of law has evolved –law 
is seen as an institution.1 This is a middle way between the normative and the 
realist view of law. A different view of the criminal justice system has also 
evolved. The legal system is not a system of norms only, as represented by 
positivists;2 rather norms are only one unit in the examination of the legal 
system; it is the sheer force of the institutions that give life to the dead letters of 
the law – the formalist school.3 These developments appear to have changed the 
debate on the nature of the law from one of content to a process. Thus, discourse 
on interpretation of the criminal law should take these new developments into 
consideration in addition to the theoretical developments in the field of 
interpretation of law itself.  
In order for the law to be applied, it is necessary that the law should be 
interpreted. It is this conception of interpretation that had taken shape and 
meaning in past three centuries. This is further assisted by a growing belief that 
because the courts also define the object of interpretation, they influence the 
content of the law through interpretation more than the lawmaker does. 
Sometimes, interpretation is understood as “transformation” of the law.4 
Consequently, because the interpretation process defines the outcome of the 
case, there are differing opinions on the purpose and method of interpretation.  
Interpretation of the criminal law is a ‘dialogue’ between the judge and the 
text of the law; this ‘dialogue’ between the judge and the text of the law is 
influenced by a host of factors beyond the mechanical methods of interpretation. 
Defining the scope of the object of interpretation, assumptions on the 
                                           
1 O. Weinberger (1991) Law, Institution, and Legal Politics: Fundamental Problems of 
Legal Theory and Social Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer); M. La Torre (2010) Law as 
Institution (Dordrecht: Springer). 
2 H.L.A. Hart (1961) The Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press). J. Raz (1980) 
The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, Second Ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). H. Kelsen (1970) Pure Theory of Law (Berkley: California 
University Press) Trans. by Max Knight, represent this view.  
3 R.S. Summers (2006) Form and Function in a Legal System: A General Study (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). In the introduction, he succinctly discusses the significance 
of and the credit due to form. In the following chapters, he discusses five areas of 
functional unites of a legal system and interpretation falls under the methodological type of 
form. Id., at 54. 
4 M. Zamboni (2008) Law and Politics: A Dilemma for Contemporary Legal Theory (Berlin: 
Springer), at 32. L.J. Wintgens (2002) “Rationality in Legislation – Legal Theory as 
Legisprudence: An Introduction” In L.J. Wintgens (Ed.) Legisprudence: A New 
Theoretical Approach to Legislation (Oxford: Hart Publishing), at 19. K. Touri (2002) 
“Legislation between Politics and Law” In L.J. Wintgens (Ed.) Legisprudence: A New 
Theoretical Approach to Legislation (Oxford: Hart Publishing), at 104. 
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organisation of the criminal norms, and the views of the institutions engaged in 
the interpretation of the law about their interpretative responsibilities most 
certainly define the outcome of the case.  
The Criminal Code expressly prohibits interpretation by analogy; and it 
contains extensive provisions governing the interpretation and the application of 
the criminal law. In continental criminal code, the rules are found exclusively in 
the special part of the code. There are principles predominantly included in the 
general part; in fact, there are also few principles in the special part. The rules 
and some principles are the operative part of the criminal law written in 
“hypothetical-conditional” and consequence manner;5 they constitute the 
criminal norms and are subject to interpretation.  
There also are meta-norms, better referred to as ‘postulates’, such as, the 
common good principle, the principle of legality, and the non-retroactivity of 
the criminal law, that regulate and scaffold the interpretation and application of 
the criminal norm. Often, they are found in the general part of the criminal code, 
but some, as they are developed in the field of political theory are not fully 
written in the code. It is within the parameter that is set by those postulates that 
the ordinary methods of interpretation are applied.  
This article examines the normative and institutional elements of 
interpretation based on the criminal laws, the Federal Supreme Court Sentencing 
Guideline and the Cassation Division binding interpretative decisions. Section 1 
gives a general background of interpretation of law in general and interpretation 
of the criminal law in particular. Section 2 dwells on how legislative drafting is 
related to interpretation and how interpretation augments knowledge of the law. 
It attempts to indicate that the concept of interpretation includes finding the law 
to the facts of a case and applying such law. It then tries to address issues related 
to interpretation for better understanding of the notion that interpretation does 
not stand by itself but is inextricably linked with other areas, such as, drafting of 
criminal legislation and knowledge of the law. 
Section 3 deals with the organisation of the criminal norms and the meta-
norms. It discusses the meta-norms that ‘scaffold’ the interpretation of the 
criminal norms. Section 4 attempts to delimit the scope of the object of 
interpretation. It argues for hermeneutic interpretation of the criminal law. 
Section 5 addresses the issue whether and when the criminal law needs to be 
interpreted. Section 6 deals with the institutions responsible for interpretation, 
including the Cassation Bench binding interpretative decision making power. 
Section 7 deals with how interpretation of the criminal law is to be conducted. 
In this section, the manners of interpretation are discussed. Arguments are 
                                           
5 G. Hallevy (2010) A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law (Berlin: 
Springer), at 16. 
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forwarded in this section in favour of substantive interpretation and against 
formal interpretation with specific focus on the binding interpretative decisions 
of the Cassation Bench and the sentencing guideline of the Federal Supreme 
Court as illustrations of judicial formalism.  
1. General Remarks about Interpretation of the Criminal Law 
1.1 Brief history of the development of the concept of interpretation  
Beyond examination of the various theories of interpretation, the discussion on 
interpretation of the criminal law involves examination of the content and 
structure of the criminal norms, the method of interpretation, and the 
interpreting body’s manner of interpretation. There has been a continuous 
change in those three areas over the centuries having a convoluted effect over 
the conception and the practice of interpretation of the criminal law.  
In the ancien regime,6 interpretation was understood by looking at the body 
that was involved in the practice of interpretation.  As there was no separation of 
power,7 every power was vested in the monarch.8 Interpretation of the law was, 
therefore, ultimately vested in the monarch not for his wisdom of interpretation, 
but rather for the authority he had to make laws.9 However, for practical 
reasons, there were sovereign courts in France, for instance, which were called 
Parlement.10 These courts did not have the power to interpret the law because 
they were legally prohibited to conduct ‘interpretation’ of the law in general;11 
they just had the power to apply the law. In this period, ‘interpretation’ was 
understood to mean deviation from the text of the law, the power exclusively 
                                           
6 Ancien regime refers to the old regime before the French Revolution. 
7 M. Stolleis (2011) “Judicial Interpretation in Transition from Ancien Regime to 
Constitutionalism” In Y. Morigiwa, M. Stolleis and J-L. Halperin (Eds.) Interpretation of 
Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law 
(Heidelberg: Springer), at 4. 
8 Id., at 6, 9. The judiciary was part of the executive. Id., at 6, 13 
9 Id., at 9. 
10 Parlements were sovereign (higher) courts participating in the legislative process and 
interpretation of legal texts before the French Revolution. J-L. Halperin (2011) “Legal 
Interpretation in France under the Reign of Louis XVI: A Review of the Gazette de 
tribunaux” In M. Stolleis and J-L. Halperin (eds.) Interpretation of Law in the Age of 
Enlightenment: From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law (Heidelberg: Springer), at 
22, 36. L.B. Register (1916) “Judicial Power of Interpretation under Foreign Codes” In 65 
U. of Penn. L. Rev. and Am. L. Register No 3, at 40. 
11 Halperin, supra note 10, at 23. 
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vested in the Monarch.12 That is why there had been serious objection to 
interpretation of the law by the courts.13 
The French developed a wise distinction between authoritative (authentic) 
interpretation which was vested in the monarch and doctrinal interpretation 
vested in the courts.14 Such distinction was necessary because of the plurality of 
laws that were applicable; i.e., there were laws potentially applicable to a 
particular case, such as, ecclesiastical law, Roman law, French law, and 
customary law.15 In this doctrinal interpretation, the courts determined which 
law is applicable, the knowledge (and skill) that was very much lacking in the 
monarch, and they decided the content of such law.16 
The judgments of the courts were very shorthand, only a page or two, and the 
methods of interpretation of the law were vague.17 Those judgments include 
only the name of the parties, the summary of the facts, and the finding of the 
court; there was no reason provided for the conclusion.18 Those judgements 
were published in publication called Law Reports.19 The reason for publication 
                                           
12 E.  Freund (1917) “Interpretation of Statutes” In 65 U. of Penn. L. Rev. and Am. L. 
Register No 3, at 208. 
13 For instance, it is this aspect that Voltaire refers to as “corruption” of the law. Halperin, 
supra note 10, at 29. He is also quoted for asserting that judicial interpretation is "the most 
detestable of all institutions." Freund, supra note 12, at 208. As such, there were efforts to 
avoid judicial interpretation. For instance, Napoleon drafted a code with a commentary 
that would exclude interpretation; the Austrian law had included 19,000 sections in order 
to make the law as clear as possible. All such efforts were, however, unsuccessful. R. 
Zimmermann (1997) “Statutas unt strict einterpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A 
Continental Perspective” In 56 The Cambridge L. J., No 2, at 325, 326. H. Mohnhaupt 
(2011) “The Object of Interpretation: Legislation and Competing Normative Sources of 
Law in Europe During the 16th to 18th Centuries” In M. Stolleis and J-L. Halperin, (eds.) 
Interpretation of Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the Rule of the King to the Rule 
of Law (Heidelberg: Springer), at 88. Y. Morigiwa (2011) “Interpretation by Another 
Name: The Function of Rechtsfindung in the Modern State” In Y. Morigiwa, M. Stolleis, 
and J-L. Halperin (Eds.) Interpretation of Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the 
Rule of the King to the Rule of Law (Heidelberg: Springer), at 134. 
14 Halperin, supra note 10, at 24. 
15 Id., at 24, 25. 
16 Id. S. Dauchy (2011) “Legal Interpretation and the Use of Legal Literature in the 18th 
Century Law Reports of the “Parlement” de Flandre” In Y. Morigiwa, M. Stolleis, and J-
L. Halperin (Eds.) Interpretation of Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the Rule of 
the King to the Rule of Law (Heidelberg: Springer), at 54. 
17 Generally, see Dauchy, supra note 16. 
18 Id., at 48, 55. 
19 These Law Reports were published by those who were “insiders”, such as, judges and 
state advocates taken from their personal notes and notes meant to be for office use.  
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of those Law Reports was to provide material to lawyers and judges from which 
to abstract a general principle of interpretation of the law.20 
As these judgments published in the Law Reports were not binding as 
precedents, they died out, and were progressively substituted by dictionaries. 
Those dictionaries were meant to be coherent and comprehensive writings on a 
given subject.21 These dictionaries helped the development of legal doctrines or 
principles.22 
From the publications of those dictionaries, two developments followed: 
first, as those doctrines helped to systematically organize rules, they facilitated 
the codification of the law.23 Second, later developments took advantage of the 
French distinction between authoritative and doctrinal interpretation,24 and 
because the codes required substantial knowledge of the law, freedom of 
interpretation of the law by the court evolved.25 However, in order to limit the 
power of the court deviating from the text of the law under the guise of 
interpretation, the codes were accompanied with commentaries.26 In several 
areas of the law, the decision of the cassation court had been found to be a 
useful tool in guiding the lower courts in the interpretation of the law.27 
1.2  The change in the notion of the nature of the law 
Interpretation is also impacted by the change in the conception of the law. The 
Age of Enlightenment is known for the positivisation of laws in general and the 
criminal law in particular. Thus, the progressive positivisation of the law 
requires specific rules of interpretation28 having such a statute as its object.29 
                                           
20 Halperin, supra note 10, at 22. Dauchy, supra note 16, at 50. 
21 Unlike the Law Reports, which were published by ‘insiders’, those dictionaries were 
published by those who were ‘outsiders’ of the realm of the practice of law. Halperin, 
supra note 10, at 30, 31. Dauchy, supra note 16, at 56. 
22 Dauchy, supra note 16, at 56, 49 note 14. 
23 Id., at 57. Mohnhaupt, supra note 13, at 88. 
24 Halperin, supra note 10, at 43. Dauchy, supra note 16, at 57 
25 Halperin, supra note 10, at 24, 36, 43. Stolleis, supra note 7, at 14. J. Schroder (2011) 
“The Concept and Means of Legal Interpretation in the 18th Century” In Y. Morigiwa, M. 
Stolleis, and J-L. Halperin (Eds.) Interpretation of Law in the Age of Enlightenment: 
From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law (Heidelberg: Springer), at 93. 
26 Mohnhaupt, supra note 13, at 88. 
27 Halperin, supra note 10, at 22, note 2; at 43; Freund, supra note 12, at 209. 
28 As the positivisation of the law had been evolving substituting the natural law, there were 
two fundamental principles of interpretation developed from the Roman law; i.e., 1. the 
latter prevails over the former and 2. the special prevails over the general. However, there 
had also been one fundamental rule that was a part of the Roman law but given significant 
place subsequent to the French Revolution: judges could not avoid making decisions 
based on absence of law; therefore, they had to decide by analogy. In this period, there 
had not been difference in rules of interpretation in criminal matters and other matters. 
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This brought about some level of idolatry of statutes;30 the early 17th century 
French exegetic school believed that the only source of law is statute.31 It 
disregarded the theoretical conception as well as doctrinal interpretation and 
analysis of the law.32 The concept of law is different depending on who is 
arguing for that notion, such as, a positivist, a naturalist, a realist, etc.; there 
was, however, a general consensus that the criminal law has to be written having 
a general part and a special part. The general part is all about doctrines.  
1.3  Fundamental structure of continental criminal law  
The contemporary continental criminal law has four basic foundational 
principles; the principle of legality, the principle of conduct, the principle of 
culpability and the principle of personal responsibility.33 The foundation of all 
these four principles is the individual free will which are also referred to as 
“supra-principle”.34 The purpose of criminal law is maintaining the social 
existence of men by preventing crime. The actions of members of such society 
of men which is a threat or harm to such social existence is proscribed if it is the 
result of choice made exercising the free will of the individual. 
From these four fundamental principles, four major substantive and structural 
outcomes follow. First, from the principle of legality follows that there is a 
crime and a consequent measure or punishment only that is provided for in the 
law. The law must specifically and clearly state the prohibited conduct and the 
consequent measures. This further restricts the creation of crimes and 
punishment by analogy. Second, from the principle of conduct, it follows that a 
person can be held liable for a crime that is possible for commission and such 
conduct must be a positive conduct provided for in the law as proscribed.35 
Third, from the principle of culpability, it follows that a person may be held 
liable if he acted with a criminal guilt; i.e., the individual is criminally 
                                                                                                            
However, in the humanist movement, a distinction between interpretation of the civil law 
and interpretation of the criminal law was made based on criminal law doctrines rather 
than rules of interpretation. Zimmermann, supra note 13, at 316, 316. 
29 Mohnhaupt, supra note 13, at 62. 
30 Halperin, supra note 10, at 38. 
31 Dauchy, supra note 16, at 45. M. Troper (2011) “What Is Interpretation of Law for the 
French Judge?” In Y. Morigiwa, M. Stolleis and J-L. Halperin (eds.) Interpretation of 
Law in the Age of Enlightenment: From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law 
(Heidelberg: Springer), at 139, 144. The restriction on the scope of interpretation until the 
middle of the 20th century is elaborated by J. Bonnecase (1930) “The Problem of Legal 
Interpretation in France” 12 J. Of Comp. Legislation and Int. L., No 1. 
32 Dauchy, supra note 16, at 45, 46. 
33 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 3 – 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Exceptionally, the failure to act is also punished but the inaction must be a positive 
abandoning in order to bring about a certain result or in a breach of duty.  
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responsible for her intentional act, and in exceptional circumstances when it is 
expressly provided for, for her negligent conduct. Accidents (actions without 
guilt) are not criminal conducts. She is responsible for what she intends as a 
consequence; she is not responsible for anything that exceeds her desired 
consequence. Likewise, she is not responsible for consequences that went 
beyond her duty of care. Fourth, from the principle of personal responsibility, it 
follows that the individual is responsible for her own guilty action only; there is 
no vicarious criminal responsibility.  
These four core principles of continental criminal law are incorporated into 
the Ethiopian Criminal Code. The principle of legality is provided for under Art 
2; the material objects of crime, including degrees of commission of a crime and 
of participation, are provided for under Arts 23-47; subjective elements of crime 
are provided for under Arts 57-67, and Arts 48-56 which provide for the mental 
responsibility; further, justificatory defences and excuses are provided for under 
Arts 68-80. Finally, personal responsibility of the individual is provided for 
under Art 41.  
2. Interpretation, Legislative Drafting, and Augmenting 
Knowledge of the Criminal Law 
In addition to the foregoing general discussion regarding the nature of 
interpretation, we need a clear definition and discussion on the scope and 
practice of interpretation of the criminal law. Currently, interpretation may be 
understood to be a judicial activity in an effort to finding the law applicable to 
the facts of the case in dispute, giving content to the provision of the law and 
applying such law to the disputed facts.36 
Interpretation has evolved to the level it has today for two reasons; first, the 
criminal law is now primarily positive law from which (adverse) deviation 
renders the law invalid;37 and second, the judiciary has developed as an 
independent institution to interpret the criminal law. However, the understanding 
                                           
36 Smith opines interpretation is a matter of fact because he believes it is a judicial activity in 
applying a rule to a certain fact. H.A. Smith (1927) “Interpretation in English and 
Continental Law” In 9 J. of Comp. Legislation and Int. L., No 4, at 153. However, others 
hold it is a matter of law because the content of the law is determined by the rules of 
interpretation. Freund, supra note 12, at 207. H. Silving (1950) “A Plea for a Law of 
Interpretation” In 98 U. of Penn. L. Rev., No 4, at 503. Whether interpretation is a matter 
of law or a matter of fact, the above argument is only based on their subsequent points and 
they did not critically examine the facts or the concept of interpretation itself. Those who 
argue interpretation is a matter of law subsequently discuss about rules of interpretation. 
37 A. Ornowska (2010) “Introducing Hermeneutic Methods in Criminal Law Interpretation 
in Europe” In J. Jemielniak, P. Miklaszewicz (Eds.) Interpretation of Law in the Global 
World: From Particularism to a Universal Approach (Heidelberg: Springer), at 252. 
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of the concept and practice of interpretation have become much more complex 
and sophisticated because it is seen in different contexts, including lawmaking 
and human communication.  
2.1  Legislative drafting and interpretation of the criminal law  
Often, it is indicated that legislative drafting and interpretation of the law are 
‘inextricably’ connected38 and that drafting guides interpretation.39 This is 
because the lawmaker and the body interpreting the law (i.e., the court) are 
different bodies, and the law is a communication between them. However, in 
order to make the communication of the intention of the lawmaker clear, the law 
is drafted by professionals following certain rules governing such conduct.40 In 
not few cases, the legislature also defines certain commanding terms in the 
law.41 In the criminal law, the general part is meant to do just that.  
The criminal law has two purposes42 – as a rule of conduct, it gives notice to 
the ordinary citizen to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; thus, 
the principle of legality requires clarity in the statement of the law. The criminal 
law, as a rule of adjudication, on the other hand, is directed to the professionals; 
thus, for simplicity reason, it uses certain terms of art which have several 
preconceptions and intricacies.43 
These apparently conflicting interests negatively impact the drafting of the 
criminal law as each purpose is pulling the drafters in opposite direction in the 
selection and use of words. Often the rules of adjudication hide the rules of 
conduct for drafters focus on the former.44 Certainly, the general part of the 
criminal law is drafted in a manner an ordinary person may not understand. 
However, the special part of the criminal law is clear more often than not. The 
Special Part of the Criminal Code focuses on the rules of conduct while the 
General Part deals with general rules applicable to all offences including rules of 
                                           
38 Zimmermann, supra note 13, at 325. 
39 Graven reflects on his concern on the application of the law when he drafted the 1957 
Penal Code. Thus, he endeavoured to make the Code “as clear, complete and precise as 
possible” both to the judge and the ordinary citizen. J. Graven (1964) “The Penal Code of 
the Empire of Ethiopia” In 1 J. Eth. L No 2, at 281, 287. Freund, supra note 12, at 216. 
40 Smith, supra note 36, at 155. Wintgens, supra note 4, at 15, 16. 
41 Often in various proclamations the legislature defines words and phrases which are 
frequently used in such legislation or which are key to the interpretation and application 
of such legislation. Yet, even those defined words are subject to judicial interpretation.  
42 P.H. Robinson (2000) “Structuring Criminal Codes to Perform Their Function” In 4 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev., No 1, at 1-5. 
43 Silving, supra note 36, at 514, 515. 
44 Id., at 5, 6. The general observation is that, in his reflections, Graven, again, was very 
much concerned about how the judge could find the law, in the new Code, to a particular 
case. Graven, supra note 39, at 281-283.  
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adjudication; but their areas of focus are not mutually exclusive.45 Thus, in 
drafting the criminal law, the lawmaker needs to have these purposes in mind 
for a proper communication to both the citizen (so that the law can be complied 
with), and to the court so that the intention of the lawmaker may properly be 
enforced in the event the law is violated.46 
2.2  Interpretation of and augmenting knowledge of the law 
There are different understandings regarding knowledge of the law and 
interpretation of the law. Some opine that interpretation of the law presupposes 
knowledge of the law;47 while others believe that interpretation facilitates 
comprehension of the law.48 The conclusions of these discussions depend of the 
content of their argument. Often interpretation comes to the fore in the 
adjudication process. In this case, the body interpreting the law has to be able to 
establish both the facts of the case and the applicable rules.49 Morigiwa states 
that “finding the facts of a case” is an essential skill for a lawyer as well as 
interpretation of the law.50 For him what is called ‘interpretation’ is finding the 
law applicable to a given case.51 His conclusion is founded on knowledge 
defined to be “the grasp of truth”.52 For knowledge of a particular object, he 
argued, we need to have the three terms –(we) the knowing subject, the subject 
to be known (the object), and the communication of such knowledge to others.53 
Interpretation of the law, he argues, is in perfect fit to this three-term analysis of 
knowledge.54 The facts and the applicable rules are the objects.  
However, what makes judicial interpretation different from the interpretation 
made by the parties is that, the court has monopoly of ‘truth’.55 The court has the 
                                           
45 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 145. 
46 Crim. C., Art 1, paras 1 and 2 respectively. 
47 Zimmermann, supra n 13, at 319. 323. Endicott generally argues that interpretation is an 
activity, an activity outside of our mind, while comprehension is passive and it is in our 
mind. Thus, the two are different. T.A.O. Endicott (1994) “Putting Interpretation in Its 
Place” In 13 Law and Philosophy, No 4. 
48 Silving, supra note 36, at 511, 518, 519. 
49 Morigiwa, supra note 13, at 126, 133. 
50 Id., at 133. 
51 Id., at 126, 133. The art of finding the facts of a case and interpretation of the law 
applicable to that case, in German, is called Rechtsfindndung. Id., at 133. Morigiwa refers 
to this as another name of interpretation. Id., at 137. 
52 Id., at 132. 
53 Id., at 127-131. According to Morigiwa, “the knowing subject and the subject to be known 
are transcendent to each other.” What has to be addressed is communication which is 
corresponding the proposition in our mind which we believe to be true with that of the 
state of affairs outside our mind – in this case the facts of the case and the rule. Id., at 128. 
54 Id., at 131 
55 Id., at 126, 133. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 268, 269. 
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authority to declare the outcome of the case and the interpretative question. 
Truth, in this sense, means determination of the interpretative question, the 
methods of interpretation, the facts that are deemed proved, and the applicable 
rules.56 It is this truth that controls the process of interpretation; interpretation in 
this sense “brings about authority and stability” of the law,57 because it is when 
the law is applied that it enters the social consciousness as the law is a social 
edifice.58 
3. Organisation of Criminal Norms  
Interpretation applies to criminal norms in general which may include rules or 
principles provided for in the criminal law. Their interpretation is facilitated by 
meta-norms called postulates.  
3.1. Rules   
In the level of abstraction, rules are lower level norms. They are stated in clear 
manner than principles, providing for in general terms but less abstract. 
Generally, rules have certain qualities that are unique to them –they are drafted 
in a ‘hypothetical-condition’ and consequence manner.59 The condition contains 
the operative facts, such as, the material and moral elements that are proscribed. 
Once the conditions are met, i.e., the crime is committed, the consequence, i.e., 
the measure or punishment, automatically follows.60 
The criminal law rules are meant for regulation of conduct. As such, they are 
required to meet certain formal and substantive requirements to perform their 
function efficaciously.61 Rules have to be “prescriptive” and “complete” in their 
                                           
56 Morigiwa, supra n 13, at 133. 
57Id., at 134. 
58 Mohnhaupt, supra note 13, at 61.W.S. Landecker (1941) “Criminology in Germany” In 
31 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, No 5, at 553. Prott states that judgement “reconcile[s] 
an audience with the use of power” which is “insulated” from administrative type control. 
Such reconciliation is made by way of relating the case at hand with the existing 
established legal tradition. L.V. Prott (1978) “Judicial Reasoning in the Common Law and 
Code Law Systems” In 64 Archives of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy No 3, at 
418, 419. 
59 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 12. 
60 H. Avila (2007) Theory of Legal Principles (Dordrechet: Springer), at 11, 12, 29.  
61 Summers does not appear to be clear in his statements whether he is referring to rules in 
general or to rules as opposed to principles. However, in discussing this requirement he is 
focusing exclusively on “statutory rules” and rules as opposed to principles and maxims. 
Summers, supra note 3, at 136, 137.  
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form and content,62 “general” in their statement,63 “definite” in their application, 
have a “good internal structure” and be formal and simple in their manner of 
expression.64 Where the rules appear to be incomplete, based on the principle of 
complementarity of rules, the General Part of the Criminal Code complements 
the apparent gap in those rules.65 The issue may be whether, in view of the 
principle of legality and strict interpretation of the criminal law, we can go 
beyond the text of the Code for finding the rules. In finding the rules, we cannot 
go beyond the express provisions of the law. However, it is evident that both the 
hypothetical conditions and the consequences need interpretation.  
For instance, in Ali, et. al.,66 defendants were charged for violation of the 
provisions of Art 4 of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No 952/2009.67 The Court 
did not find it easy to abstract the content from the reading of those provisions 
nor could they be supplemented by the principles in the General Part of the 
Criminal Code; it thus went to the travaux préparatoires to establish the content 
of those provisions because the provisions were vague or ‘incomplete’ to use the 
words of Summers.68 In such cases, the court should have ignored the rule as it 
defeats the purpose the criminal law as a rule of conduct.  
                                           
62 Summers argues that a rule is complete if it addresses matters of “(1) scope, (2) 
addressees, (3) requiring mental state of actors, (5) circumstances of acting, and (6) 
effects of action.” Id., at 147. 
63 The generality of the law is required for two reasons. First, it is committed to the principle 
of equality when there is “one law for all” without having anyone in mind; second, the 
“general formulation” of the criminal law requires development of a policy on which it is 
based. Hallevy, supra note 5, at 135. 
64 See, Summers, in general, supra note 3, Chapter 5.  
65 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 145; Summers, supra n 3, at 147. 
66 Public Prosecutor v. Ali Aduros, et. al. (11 December 2014, Federal High Court, File No 
134044) 
67 Art 4 provides that “Whoever plans, prepares, conspires, incites or attempts to commit any 
of the terrorist acts stipulated under sub-articles (1) to (6) of Article 3 of this Proclamation 
is punishable in accordance with the penalty provided for under the same Article.” This 
necessarily requires the reading of article 3 of the Proclamation which provides that: 
“Whosoever or a group intending to advance a political, religious or ideological cause by 
coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or destabilising or 
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional or, economic or social institutions of the 
country: (1) causes a person’s death or serious bodily injury; (2) creates a serious risk to the 
safety or health of the public or section of the public; (3) commits kidnapping or hostage 
taking; (4) causes serious damage to property; (5) causes damage to natural resources, 
environment, historical or cultural heritages; (6) endangers, seizes or puts under control, 
causes serous interference or disruption or any public service…”  
68 Ali, supra note 66. 
100                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
3.2   Principles   
The General Part of the Criminal Code contains the principles of the criminal 
law. There are also few principles scattered in the Special Part of the Criminal 
Code that guide the specific rules. There is a higher level of abstraction in these 
principles, and they serve both as the pool for rules in drafting, and for 
understanding of those rules in interpretation. The principles often help in the 
correct interpretation of the law because they set the foundation for rules. 
The relationship between the rules and principles makes it difficult to make a 
proper distinction between the two as they ‘tend to blend’.69 With some 
reservation, Avila makes a distinction between rules and principles based on 
four grounds: i.e., content, mode of application, normative relations and 
axiological foundation.70 Regarding their content, rules are “hypothetical-
conditional” –consequential;71 as such, when the conditions are met, the 
consequences follow. On the other hand, principles only give guidance to the 
judge regarding final findings.72 Although this is a unique character of rules, it is 
not exclusive to them; rarely, principles also have this quality.73 
Rules are applied as “all or nothing” in terms of mode of application.74 This 
may also be seen in their relations to each other. Thus, if there is a conflict 
between two rules, only one of them is applied rendering the other ineffective, 
unless the latter is considered as an exception of the other.75 The application of 
principles, on the other hand, is in degrees, as they have relative weight.76 This 
is also seen in the context of conflict between principles; when two principles 
collide, “the principle with higher relative weight superpose without invalidating 
the other”.77 The collision of rules is manifested in the invalidation of one of the 
rules while the conflict between principles is manifested in their application.78 
                                           
69 Avila, supra note 60, at 17. 
70 Id., at 11, 12. 
71 Id., at 11. 
72 Id., at 11, 12. 
73 For instance, as homicides are of different type and degree, the “principle” put under Art 
538 provide for the basic conditions to be met in any type of homicide case. Thus, Crim. 
C., Art 538(1) provides that “Whoever causes the death of a human being intentionally or 
by negligence, no matter what the weapon or means used, commits homicide.” The rest of 
the provisions provide for specific conduct so that such act would fall under, such as, 
“Aggravated Homicide”, or “Ordinary Homicide” or “Extenuated Homicide.” Graven, 
supra note 39, at 282. 
74 Avila, supra note 60, at 11, 14. 
75 Id., at 19 – 21. 
76 Id., at 19. 
77 Id., at 11, 19. 
78 Id., at 20. 
Methods and Manners of Interpretation of Criminal Norms                                                  101 
 
 
The nature of rules and principles varies, inter alia, in their level of abstraction –
principles are much more abstract than rules, which are very specific.79 
3.3  Meta-norms or postulates of the criminal law 
Rules and principles are discussed as rules of conduct or adjudication; they are 
norms of the criminal law subject to interpretation and application to specific 
fact situation. Meta-norms are not norms; they are about norms. Thus, norms 
and meta-norms are not on the same level. Norms are subject to interpretation 
and application while meta-norms are about how these norms are to be 
interpreted.80 The criminal law rules and principles, as rules of conduct, are 
directed to the citizen and they are (as rules of adjudication) directed to the 
public power; while meta-norms, on the other hand, are directed to the 
interpreter of the criminal norm.81 The last distinction between norms and meta-
norms is that, norms influence each other either by complementing each other or 
by contradiction. For instance, when two rules collide, one of them is validated 
while the other is invalidated, unless it is declared an exception. Likewise, when 
two principles collide, “the principle with a higher relative weight superposes 
without invalidating the other”.82 Meta-norms, on the other hand, set the 
guideline regarding the interpretation and application of those rules and 
principles without conflicting each other.83 
Those meta-norms are classified into two categories. The first category 
relates to hermeneutic postulates that help the comprehension of norms and the 
legal order.84 The single most important hermeneutic postulate is the postulate 
of unity of legal order; postulate of coherence is the sub-element of postulate of 
unity of legal order.85 The second category is applicative postulate, as it is 
related to the application of norms. These are further classified into non-specific 
postulates,86 such as, legal goods, practical accordance and prohibition of 
excess, and specific postulates, such as, equality,87 proportionality and 
                                           
79 Id., at 17, 94. 
80 Id., at 83. 
81 Id., at 83. 
82 Id., at 11, 19. 
83 Id., at 83. 
84 Id., at 84. 
85As can be abstracted from the provisions of Arts 3, 432-34 of the Criminal Code, the 
criminal lawis considered as one body of law, including any possible criminal rule 
contained in the Criminal Code or any other separate legislation, such as, special criminal 
legislation or penal provisions contained administrative legislation. Graven, supra note 
39, at 282, 284, 285, 287. 
86 Avila, supra note 60, at 99-104. 
87 Avila illustrated that equality is used, uniquely, as a rule, as a principle and as a postulate 
in different circumstances. Id., at 104. 
102                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
reasonableness.88 The following postulates of criminal law can properly be 
classified accordingly as some of them relate to the application of the criminal 
law while others may fall under hermeneutic category as they relate to the 
comprehension of rules and principles of the Special Part. Once we set the 
distinction between those norms and meta-norms, we shall specifically discuss 
the majority of the meta-norms many of which are provided for in the General 
Part of the Criminal Code while few of them are not. 
3.3.1 The protection of the common good purpose of the criminal law  
The criminal law is used for achieving certain ends.89 The protection of those 
ends is a value preference involving weighing of various interests, which 
appears subjective preference, but with objective criterion: the common good of 
the human society.90 The common good is, thus, the umbrella doctrine of the 
criminal law that defines the purpose and function of the criminal law; i.e., it 
evaluates whether the state has used the criminal law for legitimate purposes or 
not, taking the scope of criminal law out of the whims of the lawmaker which is 
least invoked doctrine in the judicial process.91 The doctrine of the common 
good limits the state’s use of coercive power as a last resort measure because it 
both positively states the scope of the criminal law and normatively dictates the 
lawmaker as to what conducts to criminalise.92 
                                           
88 Id., at 104-123. Those postulates are formal in the sense that they do not have specific 
content; they rather depend on circumstances. For instance, in the postulate of equality, 
there have to be two circumstances to put under comparison without which equality 
remains an empty container. Id., at 98.  
89 B.Z. Tamanaha (2006) The Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University) at 69, 190. 
90 Id., at 23, 75. It is the principle of utility that changed this subjective issue, a moral 
question, into empirical science. There are efforts to make the value preferences based on 
objective standards. Avila, supra note 60, at 99, 100. 
91 Avila states that “legal good” is a non-specific postulate that is used to weigh all possible 
interests. Weighing without subjective and objective criteria is of very little use. However, 
the weighing of interests is much broader postulate than specific postulates, such as, 
proportionality, equality or reasonableness, postulates very much useful in the evaluation 
of punishment than criminalization.  Id., at 99.  
92 For in-depth reading on the concept of the “common good” or “protected legal interest”, 
generally see Simeneh Kiros Assefa and Cherinet WordofaWetere (2018) “Over-
Criminalisation”: A Review of the Special Penal Legislation and Penal Provisions” In 28 
J. Eth. L No 2 (forthcoming). S. Mir Puig (2008) In “Legal Goods Protected by the Law 
and Legal Goods Protected by the Criminal Law, as Limits to the State’s Power to 
Criminalize Conduct” In 11 New Crim. L. Rev.: An International and Interdisciplinary 
Journal, No 3.M.D.Dubber (2005) “Theories of Crime and Punishment in German 
Criminal Law”In 53 Am. J. of Comp. L., No 3.L.E. Chiesa (2008) “The Rise of Spanish 
and Latin American Criminal Theory” In 11 New Crim. L. Rev., No 3. N. Persak (2007) 
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This doctrine is partly a rule of validation for criminal norms. Thus, it is 
helpful in the interpretation of the criminal law for two reasons. As a rule of 
validation, criminal norms that are not compatible with this doctrine are not 
valid, hence, not applicable. They are not valid, either because the interest they 
protect is not a substantial interest not in need of criminal law protection93 or the 
interest can effectively be protected by other means, such as, administrative 
actions and civil remedies.94 
The state regulates almost all aspects of life in society. Unwise use of 
criminalization becomes more damaging to the public than the unregulated 
conduct of the individual. For example, Art 433 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code 
has a general criminalisation stipulation on conducting business without license, 
where one is required. There is a regulation of banking business, waste disposal, 
doing a professional work, broadcasting, etc., each of which are criminally 
sanctioned under the respective legislation. However, trading without a license 
can effectively be regulated by administrative measures and civil actions than by 
the criminal law unless (a) the area of trade is a professional work that requires 
special expertise, such as, medical service, legal service, and accountancy, 
without which significant damage may be caused to those who sought the 
service; or (b) the area is strictly regulated in order to protect the social order, 
such as business undertakings in banking, insurance, and waste disposal.  
However, courts focus on the application of the law than on interrogating it in 
light of the common good. For instance, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation 
Bench in Daniel (section 3.3.2.A infra.) considered objectives of other 
administrative proclamations for guidance to interpret the penal provisions 
contained therein rather than the doctrine of the common good. This is probably 
because the determination of validity of the law based on the concept of 
protected legal interest or the common good requires the judge to go beyond the 
text of the law,95 which the court may find difficult for various reasons.  
                                                                                                            
Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, Its Limits and Continental 
Counterparts (New York: Springer), Chapter III. 
93 Mir Puig, supra note 92, at 411, 412. Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, section 2.3. 
F. Molina (2011) “A Comparison Between Continental European and Anglo-American 
Approaches to Overcriminalization and Some Remarks on How to Deal with It” In 14 
New Crim. L. Rev. No 1, 124. D. Husak (2004) “The Criminal Law as Last Resort” In 24 
Oxford J. of Legal Studies No 2, at 208 ff. 
94 Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92. Mir Puig, supra note 92, at 418. Husak, supra note 
93, at 208 ff.  
95 Despite some reservations, the concept of “common good” is used to test the legitimacy 
of the criminal law. Wintgens, argues that “thinking in terms of rules is still the dominant 
pattern of legal thinking” and he attempts to question the legitimacy of law and false 
consciousness of rule of law from an external point of view; supra note 4, at 14. Thus, 
the legitimacy cannot be questioned from inside; the legitimacy can effectively be 
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3.3.2.The principle of legality 
The principle of legality is a fundamental principle in any modern criminal law. 
In the Ethiopian criminal law, the principle of legality has five sub-principles –
the power to declare the law and the manner of declaration of such norms, 
temporal and spatial application of those norms, interpretation of such criminal 
norms, and prohibition of double jeopardy. 
A. The power to declare and the manner of declaration of the criminal norm 
The criminal law rules are conditional statements, i.e., a criminal law rule has 
both a condition clause, the operative facts that constitute the crime, and a 
consequence clause which is the measure or punishment attached to the 
condition when fulfilled.  Those conditions must be valid; i.e., the conditional 
clause must refer to “actual occurrences that could happen or occur”.96 
Both the conditions and their consequence must be published in the official 
gazette, such as, the Federal Negarit Gazeta,97 and that there is no crime or 
punishment other than what is provided for in the law.98 This publication is 
required for two major reasons. First, it is fair to the individual to give him 
notice of what is prohibited and what is required of him so that he would foresee 
the consequences and be able to conform his conduct to the requirement of the 
                                                                                                            
examined from outside. Persak, supra note 92, at 110. Dubber, supra note 92, at 685, 
691, 92. When the questioning of the legitimacy of the criminal law goes beyond the 
rules it goes to the realm of politics. Thus, Zamboni discusses three models of the 
relationship between law and politics –the first model is the autonomous model 
represented by the positivists in which the law is treated independently of politics, the 
second is the embedded model in which politics is embedded in the law represented by, 
such as, the critical studies, and the third is the intersection model which is represented 
by the realist school which argues for the intersection of law and politics. His study is 
examining the static aspect, looking at the law and politics, the dynamic aspect, i.e., 
looking at the law making process and the political order, and third the epistemological 
aspect looking at the legal discipline and the political material. Zamboni, supra n 4.  
96 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 16. Such is the case with impossible crime where the condition 
is invalid. 
97 A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of Federal Negarit Gazeta, 
Proclamation No 3/1995 
98 This is expressly provided for under Crim. C., Art 2(1). Interpretation by analogy was a 
proper method in the Fiteha Negest; the ninth condition in order for one to become a 
judge is to know the law and being “able to draw analogies.” Fiteha Negest: The Law of 
the Kings (Trans. Abba Paulos Tsadwa in 1968), (Addis Ababa: Law Faculty, HSIU), at 
251. As the punishments for specific offences were provided for in the 1930 Penal Code, 
it could be argued that the analogical interpretation is only for elements constituting the 
crime. However, if the elements of the crime were to be interpreted by analogy, 
necessarily the punishments had the same fate. Graven, supra note 39, at 273-76.  
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law.99 This would give him a chance to plan his life; it would certainly be unfair 
to try him on the basis of a law that is not declared nor exist at the time of the 
alleged conduct because it could not be complied with anyway. Once the law is 
published, the individual is assumed to have known the content of the law, and 
ignorance of law is no excuse.100 
Second, the purpose of the criminal law is prevention of crime by giving due 
notice of the proscribed conduct and the consequent measures or punishments so 
that the individual would comply with the rules of conduct in society. It is 
generally believed that the individual would comply. Therefore, publication of 
the criminal law is an efficient way of enforcement of the criminal law.101 An 
essential part of this sub-principle (which is intimately connected to publication 
of laws) is the authority to declare the criminal law. 
According to Art 55(5) of the FDRE Constitution, The federal lawmaking 
body is the House of Peoples’ Representatives, and in effect, all elements that 
constitute a crime and the consequent measures and punishments have to be 
defined by this body having the power to declare the criminal law. This power 
cannot be delegated to the Council of Ministers or any Government Agency.102 
However, several administrative proclamations authorise the Council of 
Ministers to adopt Regulations; the Regulations in turn authorise the particular 
Agency to adopt directives. Regulations and Directives often provide for the 
operative facts. Those various proclamations routinely provide that violation of 
the Proclamation, the Regulations and Directives issued under such Proclamation 
is punishable.103 Sometimes a specific penal measure is stated in some 
                                           
99 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 26, 36. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 253. 
100 Crim. C., Art 81(1). 
101 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 26. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 253. This obviously is an 
instrumentalist aspect of the criminal law. Tamanaha, supra note 89, at 71. In the 
hierarchy of lawsthere is the Constitution at the top followed by proclamations and 
Regulations, adopted by different entities, published in the Negarit Gazeta. There are also 
directives, adopted by specific agencies, which have never been published in the Negarit 
Gazeta. Even though they often contain operative part of the criminal norm, they are not 
effective measures for notice. Thus, they cannot in any way negate the defence of 
ignorance of law. Cim. C., Art 81(3). 
102 Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, Section 4.1.B. The criminal law is manifestation of 
the “legal-social control”; it has to be adopted by the elected body representing the public 
in order to reflect the “social consensus”. The executive is not an elected body and 
cannot represent the social realities of the union. Hallevy, supra note 5, at 35, 36. Thus, 
the administrative agencies power is limited to making administrative offences which are 
punishable by moderate fine. Id., at 37 
103 For instance, see the Banking Business Proclamation No 952/2008, Art 58(7), Federal 
Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Proclamation No 648/2009, Art 70(3). 
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proclamations,104 and in other instances, general penalty clause is included.105 
These state of affairs are contrary to the provisions and the spirit of the Criminal 
Code as enunciated under Art 3.106 
The legitimacy of such declaration was tested before the Federal Supreme 
Court in Daniel.107 In this case, the respondent was charged for violation of 
Directive CTG/001/97, issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia, by attempting 
to smuggle 46.96 kilos of gold to Djibouti. The Federal First Instance Court 
convicted and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and fine as provided for 
under The Monetary and Banking Proclamation No 83/1994 Art 59(2)(b).108 
The Federal High Court reversed both the conviction and the sentence. The 
ground for such reversal was that, the prohibited act was provided for in a 
Directive issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia. This Directive was not 
published in the official Negarit Gazeta and it was written only in English, 
which is not the working language in Ethiopia. The reversal was affirmed by the 
Federal Supreme Court.  
However, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench reversed the decision 
of the High Court and the Supreme Court and affirmed the decision of the First 
Instance Court. The Cassation Bench reasoned that the prohibited acts are 
provided for in the Directive. This Directive was adopted by the National Bank 
as authorised by the Proclamation. There is no law that requires the publication 
of Directives in the Negarit Gazeta, but this does not deny the Directive its 
quality as law. The Directive has to be interpreted in order to enforce the 
objective of the enabling Proclamation. Once the requirements of prohibition are 
established in the Directive, the punishments are to be determined according to 
the Proclamation, Art 59(2)(b). 
This Cassation Bench binding interpretative decision itself understands its 
own predicaments; while there are countless directives issued by administrative 
                                           
104 For instance, the Ethiopian Federal Government Procurement and Property 
Administration Proclamation No 649/2009, Art 77, the Trade Practice and Consumers’ 
Protection Proclamation No 685/2010, Art 49, and the Banking Business Proclamation 
No 952/2008, Art 58 provide for specific penalty for conducts contrary to respective 
proclamations.   
105 The Transport Proclamation No 468/2005, Art 29, and Rural Land Administration and 
Use Proclamation No 456/2005, Art 19 made violation of the provisions of the 
Proclamations a criminal conduct punishable according to the Criminal Code.  
106 See Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, Section 3. 
107Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority v Daniel Mekonnen (Cass. File No 43781, 21 
July 2010, Vol No 10). 
108 This proclamation establishes the National Bank of Ethiopia and defines its power until it 
was replaced with the National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (as amended) 
Proclamation No 591/2008. 
Methods and Manners of Interpretation of Criminal Norms                                                  107 
 
 
agencies, it acknowledges that there is no law governing the publication or 
otherwise of such directives. The Cassation Bench further held, the decisions of 
the Federal High and Supreme Courts’ were inconsiderate to such realities and 
such trend would render those several directives null. Such application of those 
rules as if they are ‘legitimate’ (while they are not truly legitimate for various 
reasons, such as, unconstitutionality) is pure “legalism” considering the law as 
“something given”.109 If the rules are not published in the Negarit Gazeta, the 
court is not required to judicially notice, nor is a defendant denied of the right to 
defence of ignorance of law.110 In a criminal justice system severely wounded 
by over-criminalisation, this crippled application of the principle of legality only 
aggravates the problem.  
B. Application of the criminal law in terms of time 
An essential part of notice is the prospective application of the criminal law; the 
criminal law is applied prospectively. The retroactive application of the criminal 
law is limited to where such application would benefit the accused or the 
convicted person. Closely tied with the principle of legality and an overlapping 
principle given a constitutional norm status is the non-retroactive application of 
the criminal law.111 There is also another overlapping principle of the criminal 
law here –the principle of lenity– that every doubt favours the accused is 
applicable to such individual.112 It is stated that the criminal norms, the rules, are 
stated in the abstract, having no specific person or group in mind. Stated 
otherwise, the lawmaker cannot make laws having specific individuals or groups 
in mind because it is discriminatory; likewise, the lawmaker cannot circumvent 
the favourable application of the criminal law based on principle of lenity.113 
However, there are tendencies of this sort as reflected in the customs 
proclamation,114 and the new corruption crimes proclamation.115 
                                           
109 Wintegen, at 25. Thomas refers to this formalism as “Muddling Along.” E.W. Thomas 
(2005) The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at 24 ff. 
110 Proc. No 3/1995, supra note 97, Art 2(2) and (3). Crim. C., Art 81. 
111 FDRE Const., Art 22. 
112 Ibid. Crim. C. Art 5. 
113 Included in the generality of the statement of the law is equality before the law. 
114 The previous Customs Proclamation No 622/2009 is substituted by the recently adopted 
Customs Proclamation No 859/2014. The new proclamation decriminalises certain acts 
or reduces their punishment. However, Art 182of this proclamation provides that the 
cases that are pending are to be disposed of in accordance with the provision of the 
repealed Proclamation. However, this transitory provision should not be understood to 
have precluded the application of the provisions of the new Customs Proclamation to the 
extent it benefits the accused or the convicted person. FDRE Const., Art 22(2).  
115 The Crimes of Corruption Proclamation No 881/2015 is adopted substituting those 
provisions contained in the Criminal Code. Art 37 this Proclamation provides that 
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C. Application of as to place 
The third sub-principle of the principle of legality relates to the application of 
the criminal law regarding place. It suffices to state here that such sub-principle 
is regarding the territorial applicability of the criminal law and jurisdiction. (See 
Crim. C., Arts 11-20). 
D. Interpretation 
The central issue of this article is interpretation of the criminal law. Although it 
is an important part of the subject under discussion, this sub-principle deals 
exclusively with strict interpretation of the criminal law. The positive nature of 
the criminal law requires the lawmaker to make the statements of the law to be 
clear so that the ordinary person would easily understand the law and be able to 
comply with the rules of conduct.116 This further requires the strict interpretation 
of the criminal law. It thus follows that while the principle of legality expressly 
authorises the interpretation of the criminal law, it precludes a specific type of 
interpretation –analogy– either in creating an offence or determining a measure 
or punishment.117 
E. Prohibition of Double Jeopardy 
The last element of the principle of legality provided for under Art 2(5) of the 
Criminal Code is the prohibition of double jeopardy. This is also a constitutional 
principle provided for under Art 23 of The FDRE Constitution. Thus, if a 
person, by a final judgment of a court, is acquitted or convicted of a crime, he 
may not be charged, nor tried for the same offence.118 The principle of legality 
has different content in different jurisdictions; formally, this last element of the 
principle of legality is unique to the Ethiopian criminal law.119 
                                                                                                            
pending cases are to be completed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal 
Code. However, if there are provisions that benefit the accused, the provisions of this 
Proclamation would be applicable despite such transitory provision.  
116 In Europe, a “norm cannot be even be regarded as “law” unless it is formulated with 
sufficient precision” Ornowska, supra n 37, at 253.In the American system, it may be 
declared “void for vagueness.” Ibid. Hallevy, supra note 5, at 13. 
117Crim. C., Art 2(4). WorkuFekadu and ShumeArrarso v. BenishangulGumuz State 
Prosecutor (24 January 2013; Cass. File No 75387, Vol. 14).Freund, supra note 12, at 
230. 
118 This is also a ground of objection to the charge that precludes the court from looking into 
the merit of the case. Crim. Pro. C., Art 130(2)(b). 
119 For instance, the German principle of legality contains, among others, the principle of 
ultima ratio which is included under Art 1 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code. The English 
common law principle of legality, as part of the notion of rule of law, includes 
presumption of innocence. Hallevy, supra note 5, at 12, 13. However, as the prohibition 
of double jeopardy is recognized almost in every legal system, such uniqueness is not 
substantive. 
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3.3.3.Non-retroactive application of the law  
Another doctrine of the criminal law –which is also the other aspect of the 
principle of legality– is the non-retroactive application of the criminal law.120 
Positively stated, this principle declares that the criminal law is applicable only 
after it is officially declared and cannot govern facts that occur prior to the 
coming into force of the law.121 This doctrine gives the impression that it is 
about the administration of the criminal law rather than interpretation of it. If we 
look at the prospective application of the criminal law, this doctrine is as much a 
rule of interpretation because it precludes the retrospective application of the 
criminal law.122 
3.3.4  The law that favours the accused shall be applied 
It is almost a universal principle that when there are two or more laws that are 
applicable on the same subject matter, the one that favours the accused is 
applied to the case. Such is the case where there are two or more provisions that 
are applicable to the same subject matter either at the same time or temporally 
different.123 There are several provisions that are redundant in the area of, for 
instance, tax law, license related crimes, crimes of corruption and terrorism. It is 
also a consistent practice in drafting administrative penal provisions that the 
lawmaker prefers severe penalty to mild ones.124 We often see that courts follow 
this approach of the lawmaker –enforcing the severe penalty– rather than 
resorting to the milder ones, particularly in tax and license matters. Even though 
this drafting approach of the lawmaker is contrary to this principle, the court 
should always apply the law that favours the accused.125 
3.3.5.The rule of lenity 
This principle holds that the criminal law cannot be expanded beyond its scope 
and that every doubt favours the accused.126 This is reasonable when seen in 
                                           
120 Despite the fact that we have this doctrine in the 1957 Penal Code, Art 2, the Special 
Penal Code Proclamation No 8 of 1974was made applicable retroactively. 
121 This criminal law doctrine is also incorporated in the Constitution and is a constitutional 
principle, FDRE Const., Art 22. The distinction between two is that, the non-retroactive 
application of the law as incorporated in the Criminal Code is certainly a postulate as it is 
about the interpretation and application of the criminal norm. The prohibition of the 
retroactive application of the criminal law as incorporated in the constitution appears to 
be a principle because it provided for as an individual fundamental right it has direct 
application rather than about interpretation of the criminal law.  
122 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 253, 254. 
123 This is different from what is provided for under of the Crim. C., Art 6, which is an 
exception to the non-retroactive application of the criminal law. 
124 Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, Section 4.3.A. 
125 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 144. 
126 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 254. 
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light of the principle of strict interpretation of the criminal law.127 This principle 
extending beyond the scope of the criminal law appears to have entered into the 
realm of evidence law. Thus, when the court is in doubt as to the application of 
the rule, it should decide such rule is not applicable. Likewise, where the court 
is in doubt as to the occurrence or existence of a fact, the court should also 
decide in favour of the accused.  
4. Object of Interpretation  
The doctrines discussed above guide how the court should interpret the criminal 
law; closely connected to this concept and practice of interpretation is the object 
of interpretation. There are different ways of putting criminal norms in 
hierarchy. For instance, Hallevy puts the criminal norms in four levels, supra-
principles at the top, followed by fundamental principles, secondary principles 
and specific legal provisions.128 Avila, on the other hand, does not put things in 
clear hierarchy but it appears he has some structure, super-principles at the top 
followed by principles and rules in their order.129 Summers, in his discussion on 
the theory of form of a legal system, has a structure of his own –general orders, 
maxims, principles and rules.130 Although their discussions are on different 
issues, they all focus on public law identified as an object of interpretation. 
There is a general understanding that, it is the rules and principles that 
constitute the criminal norms as a result of which are subject to interpretation.131 
However, another aspect of the object of interpretation is about the source of the 
material for interpretation. Discussing the source of the law, it is both formal 
and material. The formal source of the law, as discussed in relation to the 
principle of legality, is the lawmaker. However, irrespective of whether the 
source defines the scope of interpretation, there can be cogent arguments both 
ways. Therefore, it is unreasonable to exclude the subject of formal source from 
the object of interpretation, because the consequence of the interpretation may 
be that the law is not applicable to the facts of the case at hand, as in the case of 
Daniel.132 
The object of interpretation discussed here as the material source of the law 
is, such as, the text of the statute. As indicated earlier, it is rules and principles 
that are subject to interpretation and the meta-norms are about interpretation. 
                                           
127 Even though it is not separately discussed here, the principle of strict interpretation of the 
criminal law is an important principle which also forms a part of the principle of legality. 
Ornowska, supra note 37, at 257. 
128 Hallevy, supra note 5, at 3. 
129 Avila, supra note 60, at 3. 
130 Summers, supra note 3, at 136. 
131 Avila, supra note 60, at 83, 84. 
132Daniel, supra note 107. 
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Therefore, the material source of such rules and principles is the object of 
interpretation. This proposition does not end the argument at all. The principle 
of legality provides that there is no crime or punishment unless it is provided for 
in the law; and the law has to be clear. There is no crime by analogy and the 
criminal law is void when it is vague. Under such circumstances, the rules 
appear to command the exegetic approach that we cannot go beyond the text of 
the law.  
As the criminal law is “text-oriented”, to the extent we intend to apply the 
rules, the court should stick to the text of the statute.133 However, as the methods 
and manners of interpretation are inspired not only by criminal law theories, but 
also by constitutional and political thoughts, not all of them are written.134 To 
that extent, therefore, the court may go beyond the text. Hermeneutics argue that 
the interpretation of the law presupposes both context and prior knowledge of 
the meaning of words.135 Thus, we often go beyond the text seeking the help of 
“general principles of law”.136 The hermeneutic thesis challenges the exegetic 
approach taking statute as the only source of law and interpretation is only 
searching for the intention of the lawmaker.137 The hermeneutic approach helps 
both to understand the law and to justify the use of general principles of law in 
the interpretation and application of the criminal norms.138 
In this case, one may have reservation on the application of the general 
principles of law in the face of the argument for strict interpretation of the 
criminal law and nullity for vagueness. However, hermeneutic approach only 
puts the things we know in context that are unavoidable human aspects –our 
idiosyncrasies, bias and prejudice, the pragmatic use of language in a particular 
social and historical context.139 Even though the nature of the criminal law is 
“text-oriented”, “textuality” of the interpretation of the criminal law is too 
simplistic that it only solves minor problems that could be addressed by 
                                           
133 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 271.  
134 Id., at 254.However, the obvious hermeneutic interpretation comes from a different 
source, such as, the constitutional law and human rights law unless we attempt to extend 
the principle of coherence to integrate the criminal law to other branches of law that have 
direct impact. Id., at 258. 
135 Hermeneutic approach involves interpretation and understanding of the law at three 
levels: (a) reaction to the meaning of the law; (b) explication of the law; and (c) 
application of the legal standards to the facts of a case. Ornowska, supra n 37, at 260.  
136 M. van Hoecke (2002) Law as Communication (Oxford: Hart Publishing), at 116, 161 – 
165. 
137 Ibid. Bonnecase, supra note 31, at 87, 88. 
138 van Hoecke, supra note 136, at 165. 
139 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 263. 
112                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
semantic interpretation. Thus, strict interpretation of the law does not give 
accurate depiction of the reality.140 
5. The Criminal Norm that Needs Interpretation, and the Effect 
of Such Interpretation 
Often, it is believed interpretation of the law is sought when the law is vague, or 
if there is a contradiction within the law or between the different legislation, or 
between one branch of law and another, such as, between the criminal law and 
the Constitution. Moreover, interpretation becomes necessary when there is a 
gap in the law, or the law is ambiguous or equivocal, or the literal meaning of 
the law appears ‘absurd’ or at variance from the intention of the lawmaker. 
Stated otherwise, when the law appears to be clear, it is believed that it needs no 
interpretation141 because interpretation is believed to remedy those deficiencies 
in the law –resolving conflict, clarifying ambiguity or equivocation, addressing 
gaps or the variation of objective and subjective intention of the lawmaker.  
However, when somebody proposes that the law is clear, such proposition is 
based on foreknowledge she thinks is shared. Otherwise, when somebody holds 
the law is clear it only means “it is less obscure”;142 even the assertion that the 
law is clear requires an extensive argument.143 If the proposition that 
interpretation is finding the facts of the case and finding the law that is 
applicable to the facts of such case is palatable, then interpretation is ever 
present in the judicial decision-making process. Even when the law appears to 
be clear, the court uses literal interpretation and the systematic interpretation. In 
fact, if interpretation is a dialogue between the text of the law and the judge, and 
this is done through reading of text of the law, the judge is never an “inert” 
reader.144 
The various doctrines of the criminal law are used in ‘scaffolding’ the scope 
and content of the criminal law thereby guiding the interpretation of the criminal 
law.145 Interpretation is the bridge between the text of the law and the fact 
situation in real life. It is through interpretation and application that the criminal 
law is ‘transformed’ into reality146 and enters into the social consciousness.147 
                                           
140 Id., at 272. 
141 Freund, supra note 12, at 218. Wintgens, supra note 4, at 18.  
142 Halperin, supra note 10, at 37. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 268. 
143 Silving, supra note 36, at 520, 521.  
144 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 263. 
145 Avila, supra note 60, at 92 ff. 
146 Zamboni discusses statute as “not-yet-law” which is transformed into “already law” by 
the process of interpretation. For him, interpretation transforms the “text” of the law into 
“law”. Zamboni, supra note 4. 
147 Mohnhaupt, supra note 13, at 61. Landecker, supra note 58, at 553. 
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The effect of interpretation may be deciding the law inapplicable or void. In the 
course of interpretation, the court disregards a legal provision if it determines 
that a certain provision of the criminal law is vague or has gaps that cannot be 
filled in by the application of the general principles of the criminal law or the 
rules are contrary to the basic doctrines of the criminal law. Where the law is 
applicable to the facts of the case, the court applies the law that is most suitable 
to the facts having regard to all the relevant factors.148 
6. The Interpretative Power of the Courts and the Cassation 
Bench 
Interpretation is constitutionally recognised149 fundamental judicial power and 
the court has monopoly of truth.150 The interpretative power of the court 
includes the determination of the interpretative question, the desirable method 
and manner of interpretation, the applicable law and the facts that are proved. 
The FDRE Constitution not only establishes the courts, it also vests the 
interpretative power in the courts exclusively.151 The Constitution further 
recognises the power of the Federal Supreme Court to review cases in cassation 
on matters that contain fundamental error of law.152 This power of the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Bench is further expanded by the Courts Re-
Amendment Proclamation No 454/2005, Art 2 that renders the interpretative 
decision of the Cassation Bench (by at least five judges presiding), binding on 
lower courts.  
The issue of “binding interpretative decision” needs serious consideration in 
criminal law. Although the concept of “binding interpretative decision” is not 
defined in the Proclamation, it means the lower courts are bound by the manner 
of interpretation of the law by the Cassation Division on similar matters. The 
raison d’être for adopting such a practice is the creation of consistency and 
uniformity in the interpretation and application of the law. It is stated earlier that 
                                           
148 In this regard, hermeneutic approach requires the contextual understanding of the law in 
historical context. It is an author-oriented interpretation. This helps the proper 
understanding of the law and enables comprehending the problem the law is intended to 
resolve. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 260.  
149 FDRE Const., Art 78(1); 79(1)-(3). Ornowska, supra note 37, at 257, 269 
150 See supra n 62, 63. By monopoly of truth, it means, the court that decides whether a 
particular fact is proved or not. Ornowska, supra note 37, at 269, 270. Morigiwa, supra 
note 13, at 126, 
151 FDRE Const., Art 78(4). The Constitution also prohibits the establishment of special 
courts. 
152 Id., Art 80(3)(a). 
114                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
interpretation, in general gives legitimacy and stability to the law because it is 
an act of affirming the law not changing the law.153  
It is evident from the reading of the provisions of Art 2 (of Proc No 
454/2005) that the interpretative power of the Cassation Bench is limited to such 
act as constituting and giving effect to the law and not changing or deviating 
from the law. If the interpretative act of the Cassation Division does not appear 
different from the power of other courts but the former’s decision is binding on 
the lower courts in similar matters, the question then is what is the scope of 
interpretative power of the Cassation Court? This question may be seen in light 
of the basic doctrines of the criminal law, such as, the principle of legality, strict 
construction of the criminal law, prohibition of interpretation of the criminal law 
by analogy, the principle of “void for vagueness”, etc. because these doctrines 
are binding on any court, including the Cassation Division.  
We can put the decisions the Cassation Court rendered on criminal matters 
under different categories. The first category includes cases, such as, Worku and 
Shume154and Jemila, et. al.155 in which the court enunciated the principle of 
legality and the principle of conduct; in Solomon,156 Habtu,157and  Felekech158 
the Court interpreted the principle that the law that is favourable to the accused 
is applicable. Each of those binding interpretative decisions is reasonable 
interpretation of the criminal law as they were made by merely finding the law 
applicable to the facts of such cases. Those interpretations made on the criminal 
law could have been made by any court and there is no prohibition to such 
interpretation, nor does such interpretation require special authorisation. This 
category of interpretation is not particular to the Cassation Bench because its 
binding nature emanates from the law, and the concept of binding interpretative 
decision in the criminal law merely reiterates the principle that is envisaged in 
criminal law. 
The second category of decisions would include giving effect to legislations 
that apparently lack the essential qualities of the criminal law. Such is case with 
Daniel159 where the defendant was charged and convicted as though he violated 
                                           
153 Zimmermann, supra note 13, at 318. 
154 Workuand Shume, supra note 117. 
155 Jemila Mohammed Hagos, et. al. v. Federal Public Prosecutor (26 February 2009, Cass. 
File No 38161, Vol. 9). 
156 Solomon Desalegn v. Southern Regional State Prosecutor (15 May 2014, Cass. File No 
95438, Vol. 16) 
157 Habtu Tulu v. Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (22 June 2015, Cass. File 
No 103775, Vol. 18). 
158 FelekechHailegebriel v Oromiya Justice Bureau (6 August 2009, Cass. File No 44031, 
Vol 9). 
159 Daniel, supra note 107. 
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a legislation adopted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives for violating a 
directive issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia. As indicated in Section 
3.3.2(A), this directive is written in English, and it is not published in the 
Negarit Gazeta.  
The third category of decisions are related to legalism, i.e., the Cassation 
Court applied the formal laws that are contrary to the fundamental doctrines of 
the criminal law. Such is the case with, for instance, imputation of criminal 
responsibility. In Bereha and several other similar cases,160 the Cassation Court 
held that a manager may be criminally responsible if the company is held 
criminally responsible for tax offences. This makes the manager criminally 
responsible only for being a manager without there being an act or the required 
moral element on the part of the manager. For that matter, the act could possibly 
be committed by other employees of the company in the absence of the 
manager. This is contrary to the provisions of Articles 44 and 34 of the Criminal 
Code regarding the personal nature of criminal responsibility and corporate 
criminal responsibility, respectively. Even though the decisions of the Cassation 
Bench in this third category do not necessarily deviate from the wording of the 
law, they give effect to laws that are contrary to the basic doctrines of the 
criminal law which should have been made void.  
The fourth category of decisions of the Cassation Bench may be those 
wherein the court deviates from the clear wording of the law; Sgt. Mekonnen 
and Hassan are cases on point.161 The provisions of Art 75 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code are clear that appeal from a bail decision may be lodged by a 
person who is denied bail. In these cases, the individuals were granted bail by 
                                           
160Tigrai Revenue Development Authority v. Bereha Reda (01 October 2013, Cass. File No 
86597, Vol. 15,).Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority v. AbkaleEndeshaw (29 
October 2012, Cass. File No 74237, Vol. 14).The Twins Bar and Restaurant PLC and 
Tsige Wolde v. Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (22 December 2010, Cass. File 
No 51090 Vol. 11).Tarekegn G/Giorgis, et. al., v. Ethiopian Revenue and Customs 
Authority (17 December 2009, Cass. File No 48850, Vol. 10). Ouqubay Bereha v. 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (13 March 2015, Cass. File No 100079, Vol. 
17). 
161 The Cassation Bench gave a binding interpretative decision on Crim. Pro. C., Art 75 in 
Amhara Regional State Justice Bureau v. Sgt. Mekonnen Negash (2008 Cass. File No. 
35627). Despite the decision was not published in the Supreme Court case reports courts 
were routinely following it. The same interpretative decision was rendered in Hassan 
Abdella v. Federal Public Prosecutor (2 November 2015, Cass. File No 112725, Vol 
19). It is worth noting that the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of 
Evidence Proclamation No 434/2005, Art 4 provides for release on bail and Art 5 
provides for appeal from a decision on bail matter which is available both to the accused 
and the investigator or the public prosecutor. However, the application of this provision 
was limited to individuals suspected of crime of corruption that it cannot be extended to 
other forms of crimes. 
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the lower courts and prosecution appeal was lodged to the appellate court where 
they were denied bail. In Mekonnen, the Amhara Regional Supreme Court 
Cassation Bench decided, Art 75 does not grant the right to appeal (against bail) 
to the Public Prosecutor. Petitions against the grant of bail were filed before the 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division which rendered a binding 
interpretative decision on Art 75 stating that the provision does not deny the 
Public Prosecutor to lodge an appeal from a decision granting bail to a suspect. 
This is not only contrary to the doctrines of the criminal law, but goes beyond 
the scope its power to give a binding interpretative decision that is clearly stated 
under the Proclamation that states the power of the Cassation Bench.162 
It is to be noted that the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench is not 
empowered to affect the content and scope of the criminal law as proclaimed by 
the lawmaker. Its power is limited to making correct decisions (publishing those 
decisions and distributing them). This can serve the purpose of enhanced 
consistency in court decisions rather that the broadening of the Cassation 
Bench’s scope of authority in interpretation.  
7. How Interpretation of Criminal Norms is Conducted? 
7.1. Ordinary Methods of Interpretation  
As alluded to earlier, the outcome in interpretation is often determined by the 
process –how the provision is interpreted– and not necessarily by the content of 
the provision. The meta-norms guide the interpreter in the interpretation process, 
the actual methods of interpretation are discussed in this section, including how 
interpretation should be conducted. Both the problems of rule formalism as well 
as process formalism are discussed in this section.  Formalist judges influence 
the outcome of the case making justice a mechanical process. Thus, in as much 
the method of interpretation matters, how the institutions of interpretation 
engage in the process understand their role matters, if not more.163 
                                           
162 The Cassation Bench over stretched its “power” that in a binding interpretative decision it 
gave effect to a repealed law in Customs Prosecutor v BantiTa’era (25 March 2008, 
Cass. File No 28952, Vol 7). The issue was whether the public prosecutor can reinitiate a 
charge which it withdrew by virtue of Crim. Pro. C., Art 122(2). The Cassation Bench 
held that a charge withdrawn by virtue of Art 122(2) may be reinstituted by virtue of Art 
122(5). However, the provisions of Art 122(2) were specifically repealed by Office of the 
Central Attorney General of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia Establishment 
Proclamation No. 39/1993. 
163 Thomas, supra note 109, at 7-14. 
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7.1.1. Literal interpretation  
Legislative rules are expressed in words and the legislature is presumed to have 
chosen those words carefully to have legal effect.164 The criminal norms must be 
clear and intelligible to the ordinary person so that she could conform her 
conduct to the requirements of the law. It is now presumably a universal rule 
that the criminal law is interpreted strictly.165 Of all the methods of interpretation 
that are applicable in continental Europe, the literal or grammatical interpretation 
is employed whenever the words of the rules are clear complemented by 
systematic interpretation.166 
The criminal law doctrines manifest commitment to the literal interpretation 
of the criminal norms.167 Where there is a variance between the intention as 
expressed in the law (objective intention) and the presumed (subjective) 
intention, in the criminal law area, it is the objective intention to which the court 
gives effect.168 Such variance has different effect based on the nature of the law; 
in criminal law, guided by the principle of lenity, such variation may be given 
effect depending on whether it is to the benefit of the accused. 
7.1.2. Logical interpretation  
Logical reasoning is said to be “the only respectable method of reasoning” in 
continental Europe.169 Logical interpretation may be seen in two ways. The most 
common one is syllogism –the law is the major premise; the facts of the case are 
the minor premise and the judgement is a conclusion.170 Legal syllogism applies 
at the stage of application of the criminal law to the facts of a case. However, 
there are diverse logical interpretations both for the purpose of finding the law, 
for the facts of the case and giving content to the words of the law, such as, 
contextual reading which requires deduction or induction. 
                                           
164 Freund, supra note 12, at 218 
165 Id., at 213, 214, 217. 
166 V. Sacks and C. Harlow (1977) “Interpretation, European-Style” In 40 The Modern L. 
Rev., No 5, at 579 
167 Ornowska, supra note 37, at 252, 253. 
168 In Germany, the objective meaning is advocated because as it is drafted by professionals 
“the statute may be more intelligent than the legislator” Silving, supra note 36, at 507, 
508, note 33. In France, it is called “presumed intention.” Bonnecase, supra note 31, at 
87. This is what Ornowska referred to as “the canon of text objectivity” because 
preference is given to the objective intention of the lawmaker through interpretation. 
Ornowska, supra note 37, at 262, 263. 
169 Prott, supra note 58, at 428. Even in the common-law system, legal reasoning follows a 
certain pattern: Issue, Rule, Application and Conclusion. Leaving aside the issue, which 
is permeating every litigation, the rest of the structure of the argument constitutes a 
syllogism.  
170 Id., at 420. 
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7.1.3. Systematic interpretation   
Codes are different from statutes in that their formulation (in terms of structure 
and in terms of the statement they use) has the highest level of abstraction.171 
This is based on the fact that a code is a comprehensive and harmonised body of 
law on a particular area. However, there is no different method of interpretation 
of codes and statutes.172 This is particularly so in criminal law where the 
interpretation of statutes is guided by the General Part of the Criminal Code.  
The Criminal Code is supposed to be the sole or the principal source of the 
criminal norm.173Administrative legislations would only contain administrative 
sanctions by administrative agencies or fine.174 Any special penal legislation 
must mean to govern extra-ordinary situations that were not foreseen by the 
Criminal Code and which cannot be reasonably accommodated in the Criminal 
Code. However poorly organised they may be, the Criminal Code, special penal 
legislation, and administrative regulations containing penal provisions constitute 
one body of law –the criminal law. In order to find the law and apply to the 
specific facts, the system of the organisation should be taken into consideration.  
A. The General Part v the Special Part of the Criminal Code 
The criminal law has both a rule of conduct and a rule of adjudication aspect. 
Thus, the General Part is the one that is most essential for adjudication than for 
notice.175 The rules of adjudication appear to be more complicated and 
substantial in number than the rules of conduct.176 
It is the General Part that defines not only what a punishable conduct is but 
also what the lawmaker can criminally punish.177 As seen in the interpretation of 
the Criminal Code, in the tripartite interpretation, the objective elements, the 
subjective elements, responsibility, justifications, excuses, and related matters 
are provided for in the General Part of the Criminal Code.178 The general 
framework of the criminal law is laid down in the General Part of the Criminal 
                                           
171 Graven, supra note 39, at 282, 287. B.W. Frier (1991) “Interpreting Codes” 89 Michigan 
L. Rev., No 8, at 2205. 
172 Id., at 2209. 
173 Graven, supra note 39, at 282, 284, 287. Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, Section 3. 
174 See the discussion made regarding the content of Art 3 of the Criminal Code in Simeneh 
and Cherinet, supra note, Section 3. 
175 This is what Robinson refers to as ex-post function of the criminal law. Robinson, supra 
note 42, at 5, 7. 
176 Id., at 7. In this context, the rules of adjudication include not only the General Part of the 
Criminal Code but also the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the 
Constitution.  
177 Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note 92, Sections 2.2. and 2.3. 
178  Robinson, supra note 42, at 5. 
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Code. Thus, the General Part of the Criminal Code contains substantial size of 
doctrines that shade light on the Special Part of the Code.  
All the doctrines discussed here, such as, principle of legality, non-
retroactive application of the criminal law and the principle of lenity, are found 
in the General Part of the Criminal Code. Further, the General Part addresses 
specific issues. For instance, if the moral element is not provided for in the 
Special Part of the Criminal Code, it is provided that the moral element required 
for such conduct is intention.179 The Special Part of the Criminal Code provides 
for specific acts that are criminalised and the consequent measures when such 
provision is violated. As such, the Special Part is given effect only when seen 
through the lens of the General Part. Therefore, the systematic reading and 
understanding of the Code or the criminal law in general is necessary both for 
the purpose of finding the law as well as for the proper application of the law 
B. The General Part of the Criminal Code v special penal legislation and 
administrative regulations containing penal provisions  
Art 3 of the Criminal Code provides for the possibility of having a special 
legislation of penal nature. Certainly, there are several special penal legislation 
and administrative legislation containing penal provisions.180 The Criminal Code 
is explicit in stating that the General Part of the Criminal Code is applicable to 
those other legislation, unless the latter expressly sets aside the application of 
the General Part to such legislation. So far, there is no such legislation which 
excludes the application of the General Part of the Criminal Code.181 Therefore, 
the provisions of special penal legislations and the penal provisions of 
administrative legislation may be interpreted in conformity with the principles 
of the General Part of the Criminal Code. 
C. Purposive interpretation of the criminal law  
This method of interpretation is evident from the discussion on the doctrine of 
the common good. It is further stated earlier that the purpose of the criminal law 
is prevention of crime by giving due notice and when it is not complied with it 
provides for specific measure or punishment. The punishment is imposed not for 
any particular reason but to show to the public that the promise is genuine.182 
                                           
179 Crim. C., Arts 58(3), 59(2). 
180 The nature of those special penal provisions is discussed in Simeneh and Cherinet, supra 
note 92, Section 3. 
181 Ibid. 
182Landecker, supra note 58, at 554. C. Beccaria (1995) Beccaria On Crimes and 
Punishments and Other Writings, R. Bellamy (Ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), at 31. E. Monachesi (1955) “Pioneers in Criminology: IX Cesare Beccaria (1738-
1794)” In 46 J. of Crim. L., Criminology and Police Science No 4, at 455. 
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This purpose governs the whole of the criminal law.183 Penal provisions 
contained in administrative legislation and special penal legislation have an 
identical purpose that is provided for under Art 1 of the Criminal Code, which 
affects the legitimacy of such rules.184 Therefore, when any criminal norm is 
interpreted, it must be interpreted in light of its purpose as stated under Art 1.185 
D. The tripartite interpretation of the Criminal Code 
The Ethiopian Criminal Code is a continental code both in content and structure. 
The Code fully integrates the theories of crime and punishment developed in the 
continental legal culture into its corpus.186 As such, it also takes after the 
continental tradition in the interpretation and application of the criminal law.  
The continental criminal law adopts a tripartite interpretation method.187 First 
the court establishes whether both the material and the subjective elements of 
the crime are present within the meaning of Art 23 of the Criminal Code. Once 
the court establishes the existence of both the moral and material elements of the 
crime, it then goes to the determination of the existence of justificatory defences 
negating criminal responsibility.188 For instance, Arts 78 and 75 respectively 
deal with legitimate defence, and necessity. Finally, where there is no 
justification, the court determines the existence and extent of excusable defences. 
Excusable conduct does not negate criminal responsibility but it only reduces 
the criminal responsibility of the accused.  
7.2. Against Interpretative Formalism 
Methods and rules of interpretation constitute the skeleton of the interpretative 
process of criminal law; the response to the question ‘how to interpret?’ is the 
blood and flesh. Interpretation is always skewed by the view of the interpreter 
about the law and the judicial process. When the court interprets the law, it 
should “tend to be public reasoned and justice oriented”.189 It is public reasoned 
                                           
183 Graven, supra note 39, at 282. 
184 It is this method of looking at the Directives adopted by the National Bank of Ethiopia 
that the Federal Supreme Court missed in Daniel, supra note 107. 
185 Hallevy, supra note, at 144 
186 See Simeneh and Cherinet, supra note, Section 2.8. 
187 This is initially developed in the German criminal law but it is also borrowed and 
transplanted to all other continental criminal law system. See Dubber, supra note 92, at 
681; T. Vormbaum and M. Bohlander (Eds.) (2014) A Modern History of German 
Criminal Law (Berlin: Springer), at 16, 17. A. Petrig and N. Zurkinden (2015) Swiss 
Criminal Law (Zurich: Die Deutsche Bibliothek), at 56, 91, 98. 
188 Persak states that the court is evaluating the wrongfulness of the conduct itself. This 
contradicts with her statement that criminalisation is a matter of policy decision not 
based on the inherent quality of the conduct itself. Persak, supra note 92, at 5, 108-110. 
189 Morigiwa, supra note 13, at 136. 
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because justice is “a public good like clean air, water and roads” and it is 
rendered in society.  
Interpretation should also strive to achieve justice.190 Lawmaking is “value 
creation […] informed by theories of justice and fairness” and when the law 
fails to achieve that, the courts are there “to ensure rationality and justice in the 
law” through interpretation.191 There are those who consider judicial 
interpretation as a process and there are those who believe the court should be 
progressive to meet the demands of the day. There are also pragmatists who 
balance both the form and the substance of the law.192 
Positive law is prone to be formalist, and formalism is “a clear opponent of 
fairness and justice” as it masks the choices, and it renders judicial reasoning a 
mechanical and “artificial process.”193 A formalist judge believes he is sticking 
to the ‘rules’ of the law, it is a preference the judge makes disregarding several 
choices which are not made clear in the judgment.194 Despite the growing 
disfavour to formalism,195 there are factors that limit the judge’s independence, 
forcing him to be formalist. They are put under three broad categories: external 
constraints,196 internalised constraint197 and structural constraints,  
Under structural constraints, fall “a number of preconceptions, predilections 
and prejudices” that result from a formalistic approach.198 These are effectively 
reflected in treating certainty as a primary goal of adjudication as reflected in 
the sentencing guideline, overtly coercive and unwavering compliance with the 
binding interpretative decision of the Cassation Bench,199 leaving any significant 
                                           
190 Id., at 137. 
191W.N. Eskridge, Jr. (2010) “Interpretation of Statutes” In D. Patterson (Ed.) A Companion 
to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Second Ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell), at 
194. 
192 Id., at 195. 
193 Thomas, supra note 109, at 55. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Formalism in the sense that is put by Thomas, supra note 109, not in the sense that is put 
by Summers (supra note 3). 
196 Listed in this category are review of the decision of the judge by appeal, requiring the 
judge to give reason for a decision, her legal education and training, and community 
assessment keeps her accountable to a certain process. Thomas, supra note 109, at 243-
45. 
197 Included in this category are institutional commitments of the judge to the judiciary by 
oath of office and ethical rules of propriety and judicial self-restraint. Thomas, supra 
note 109, at 246-47 
198 Thomas, supra note 109, at 249  
199 It is a routine practice regarding the interpretation and application of a particular 
provision that where there is a specific cassation decision and litigants cite such 
decisions, the court follows such interpretation of the Cassation Court scrupulously.  
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changes to the lawmaker,200 consequently, showing preference to matters of 
form than to substance when the two show apparent conflict, in general 
maintaining minimum judicial discretionary power.201 Besides the self-imposed 
and other traditional restrictions on the court, the latter is further coerced by the 
lawmaker as evidenced by the Federal Supreme Court Sentencing Guidelines 
and the binding nature of the Cassation Court interpretative decisions. It may be 
argued that both the Sentencing Guidelines and the binding interpretative 
decisions of the Cassation Court are internalised constraints.  
7.2.1. The Federal Supreme Court Sentencing Guidelines   
The Criminal Code is comprehensive. It has the material and subjective 
requirements constituting a crime, participation in and responsibility for 
criminal conduct, justificatory and excusatory defences. Further, should 
defendant get convicted, the types of measures and punishments to be imposed 
are fixed in fairly proper order.202 The rules regarding the determination of 
sentence are also complete. The particular provision criminalising the particular 
conduct provides for a specific punishment. In the General Part, there are special 
and general aggravation (Arts 84, 85, 86) and mitigation grounds (Arts 82, 83, 
86). The only gap we may find in the Criminal Code is how each aggravation or 
mitigation ground may be evaluated.203 
Despite such a Criminal Code that has adequate clarity, the lawmaker 
authorises the Federal Supreme Court to adopt a sentencing guideline.204 The 
preamble of the initial Sentencing Guideline (No 1/2002) states the reasons for 
                                           
200 As seen in Daniel, supra n 107, the Supreme Court has shown high level of legalism not 
only by leaving things for the lawmaker but also applying whatever the lawmaker 
legislated on.  
201 Thomas, supra note 109, at 249. 
202 If at all there are reservations regarding the Criminal Code, it is not a matter of 
application; the Criminal Code is, unnecessarily, too comprehensive, and often the 
punishments are unreasonably high.  
203
 “ኑሩ ሠይድ (2008 ዓ.ም.)፣ የተሻሻለው የቅጣት Aወሳሰን መመሪያ ቁ 2/2006 ችግሮች- የዳሰሳ ጥናት”  
In 5 Ethiopian Bar Review No 1 (hereinafter “Nuru”), at 159. 
204 It is cogently argued by Nuru that the sentencing guideline is on matters that are well 
covered by the Criminal Code. Whether the House of Peoples’ Representatives has the 
power to delegate such power to the Federal Supreme Court may be seen along with the 
criminal law-making power of the House under section 7.2.1., infra. Both Sentencing 
Guidelines begin by aggravating the sentences from that what is provided for in the 
Criminal Code, (Nuru, supra n 203, at 133) and in certain instances, they are arbitrary. 
For instance, each mitigation grounds in the first Sentencing Guideline would mitigate 
the sentence two steps; in this the second Sentencing Guideline, each mitigation ground 
reduces the sentence only by one step. (Nuru, at 139, 148, 149). There is no reason 
provided for by the Supreme Court why the effects of mitigation grounds are 
dramatically reduced, but it is binding on the courts anyway. 
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adopting the guideline as the need for uniformity and predictability.205 In 
criminal law, the reason why the judge should interpret the law independent of 
other interferences is in order to empower him render justice. 
 In criminal law, prime focus is accorded to substantive justice rather than 
distributive justice. However, the sentencing manual, sticks to the similarity of 
punishment, i.e., the distributive justice. In a system of criminal law, which 
manifests the negative distribution of benefits as positive act of distribution of 
burdens, the substantive justice outweighs the distributive justice. Often it is 
argued that the central tenet of the criminal justice is whether a person is 
punished in proportion to his guilt. Therefore, it is material to see to it that the 
person gets the measure of punishment in proportion to his guilt than whether a 
defendant is sentenced to the same or similar measure or punishment another 
defendant in similar or identical position has undergone. No two cases could be 
identical. However, the sentencing guideline principally focuses on the 
uniformity of the sentence and the predictability of the sentence. It guides every 
judge and practitioner to arrive as a mathematically precise sentence for every 
case;206 this is quintessentially judicial formalism.  
7.2.2. The binding interpretative decisions of the Cassation Bench   
One of the attempts by the lawmaker to infuse and entrench formalism into our 
courts is the introduction of binding interpretative decisions of the Cassation 
Bench of the Federal Supreme Court. Art 2 of Proc No 454/2005 provides that a 
decision rendered by the Cassation Bench, where at least five judges are sitting, 
has a binding effect on every other court.207 The Federal Supreme Court is under 
a duty to publish and disseminate such decisions. It is not clear though whether 
                                           
205 In fact, the Sentencing Guideline describes the sentencing disparity in the sentencing 
practice prior to the adoption of the first Guideline in a denigrated manner that “no two 
criminal sentences are identical…if at all they are identical it is a mere accident.”  
[translation mine]. Sentencing Guideline No 1, Preface, paras 1 and 2. The Preamble 
leaves no room for doubt that the judges do this by disregarding the law. There is no 
evidence provided for in the Sentencing Guideline, or in other researches for that matter, 
the judges of our courts consciously and deliberately ignored the law. The Guideline 
should not have made applying the law an issue; it should rather have made it the issue of 
“what is the law? and what is the effect of each aggravation of mitigation ground?” 
206 The Federal Supreme Court Sentencing Guideline No 2, Art 27 provides that a judge who 
believes she has to deviate from what is provided for under the Guideline, she may do so 
by providing “detailed reason” and forwarding the decision to the Supreme Court, State 
or Federal, as the case may be. Obviously, it is easy for the judge to conform to the 
Sentencing Guideline than to give reason for deviation. 
207 The Cassation Court is established to correct fundamental errors of law. This is a 
constitutional power which is binding only on the parties to that particular case decided 
before the Cassation Bench. What is provided for under Art 2 of Proc. No 454 is further 
power to bind all other courts by such decision.  
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the decision of the court is binding as it is, or only if it is selected for publication 
and circulation.  However, one of the elements of the principle of legality is 
publication of the criminal norms. In accordance with the principle of legality 
and the spirit of the provisions governing the subject as stated in the 
introductions to those case report publications, the binding interpretative effect 
of decisions of the Cassation Court should thus only apply to the ones that are 
published.  
The purpose of the introduction of the binding nature of the Cassation Bench 
decision is clear –that it is meant to establish a uniform interpretation and 
application of the law. “Certainty and predictability are virtues;” however, it 
should not be “intuitively and blindingly treated as a goal of adjudication” and it 
should not override the interest of justice.208 As the application of the Federal 
Supreme Court Sentencing Guideline may be set aside by providing the reasons 
thereof, the application of a binding interpretative decision may be made 
inapplicable by distinguishing the facts, or providing reason, such as, such 
decision was made in excess of the power of the Cassation Court.  
Conclusion 
The contemporary description of a legal system is that it contains norms, 
institutions and methods, among others, interpretation being only one part of the 
latter. The norms are seen as institutions as they have both normative aspect as 
well as real effect in life. However, the effect of those norms is determined by 
the method and manner of interpretation adopted by the court. In order to help 
the interpretation and application of the norms in the Special Part of the 
Criminal Code and other penal legislation, the General Part contains meta-
norms, often called general principles.  
The meta-norms do not solve the problem; the court needs to adopt a theory 
of its own regarding the nature of the law, and define its role in the 
administration of the criminal justice. In so doing, courts must uphold justice as 
their central responsibility. Thus, a court should strive to achieve substantive as 
well as procedural justice by letting itself off the shackles of formalism both 
self-imposed and imposed from the outside. It is not an easy task; nor is it 
unattainable. Courts can, for instance, set aside a binding interpretative decision 
of the Cassation Bench where they find that it negates justice or their conscience 
by properly distinguishing the facts; they can also declare a threshold stated in 
the Federal Supreme Court Sentencing Guideline inapplicable in the particular 
case where they find it gravely unjust, provided they give valid reasons that 
serve the law, truth, reason and justice.                                                                ■ 
                                           
208 Thomas, supra note 109, at 250. 
